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College Searches and Seizures: Students,
Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment
By ICHARD DELGADO*
RECENT developments in the law of search and seizure have had
an impact that is essentially libertarian; their effect has been to safe-
guard the right of individual privacy against the needs of the state for
information.' The law relating to college students, by contrast, derives
from notions that are largely paternalistic and that emphasize institu-
tional values of discipline and order above those of individual rights.2
In searches of dormitory rooms and married student housing, the con-
trasting values underlying these two areas of law come into conflict,
and courts so far have been unable to offer a consistent and definitive
solution to the problems raised by such searches. Lacking a clear
statement from the courts, university officers charged with maintaining
order on the campuses generally have failed to formulate fair and
effective guidelines for nonconsensual entries of student quarters.3
And, students, their legal status under the Fourth Amendment still un-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Arizona State University. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Stephen Sugarman of the University of
California School of Law and Pablo Drobny, Executive Editor of the American Jour-
nal of Comparative Law in the preparation of this manuscript, and of numerous mem-
bers of the University of California campus police and University Housing Office,
without whose cooperation this article could not have been written.
1. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 401 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of
Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANsAcTION Q.
1, 1-4 (1965); see Blackwell, Evolution and Development of College Law, 20 CLEVE.
ST. L. REv. 95, 95-108 (1971). See also notes 11, 12 & 36 & accompanying text
infra; cf. Goodman & Neiderhoffer, Universities and the Police: Force and Freedom
on the Campus, 1 YALE REv. oF L. AND Soc. Ac'ON 5, 6-8 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Goodman & Neiderhoffer].
3. E.g., notes 136-38 & accompanying text infra.
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settled, have often been the victims of this failure to develop adequate
standards. 4
This article analyzes the legal doctrines that apply when a univer-
sity official enters the room of a college student without the student's
consent or a search warrant in search of incriminating evidence. First,
a hypothetical example is used to pose many of the issues that typically
arise in such searches. Then, a number of legal theories are reviewed that
have been used to justify searches of student quarters under standards
less stringent than those applied to police searches of private homes.
The deficiencies of each theory are noted. Finally, the recent Moore-
Piazzola line of cases is discussed, and it is shown that the rationale
of these cases could be used in some circumstances by college adminis-
trators to justify warrantless, nonconsensual searches of students'
rooms. Because the mandate of these cases is limited, college officials
have adopted a number of strategies in an attempt to broaden their
authority beyond the scope of Moore and Piazzola. Two of the more
common of such strategies are analyzed in detail, together with their
relationships to certain recurring problems in the theory of administra-
tive searches. In conclusion, a set of model guidelines is proposed
for university administrators who wish to avoid violating the Fourth
Amendment rights of university residents while fulfilling their duty to
supervise students and to provide a stable environment for learning.
The Problem: A Hypothetical Illustration
The telephone rang in the office of Mary Smith, head resi-
dent of Dorm E at State University. It was an anonymous caller.
"Ripped-off records," the voice whispered. "From Moses' Book-
store. Look in room 125." Without more, the caller hung up.
After conferring with the University Housing Officer, Mary
Smith telephoned the campus police. Minutes later, Lieutenant
Harris arrived at her office on the ground floor of the dormitory.
Mary and the officer climbed a flight of stairs and approached
room 125. Finding the door unlocked, Mary pushed the door
open, asking, "Anyone home?" The occupant, Abigail Jones,
looked up in surprise from her desk, where she had been reading
a copy of Paradise Lost. Explaining to Abigail that there had
been reports of illegal activities taking place in her room, Lieuten-
ant Harris proceeded to search the room thoroughly, over Abigail's
strenuous objections. At length, the officer found no stolen rec-
ords, but did find two plump marijuana cigarettes secreted in the
recesses of Abigail's bookbag.
Subsequently, Ms. Jones was suspended from State University
for one year, and her scholarship was revoked. At her trial for
possession of marijuana she was convicted and placed on proba-
4. E.g., notes 56-77, 122-48 & accompanying text infra.
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tion for six months. Her parents, a devout midwestern farm
couple, were scandalized and have refused to communicate with
her. Today, Abigail lives in a dilapidated communal house on the
edge of the university community, while earning a meager income
as a cocktail waitress. She says she has lost any interest in return-
ing to the university when her suspension expires, terming univer-
sity studies a waste of time.
The problems raised by searches such as the one depicted above
occur frequently on the nation's campuses, and affect a population of
considerable size.5 When such searches result in the seizure of incrim-
inating evidence, two consequences can result: expulsion from the
university and indictment on criminal charges. Both, of course, can
have serious effects on a student's future life.' While not every stu-
dent will choose to challenge such a search in court, the increased will-
ingness of students to seek legal redress for such actions and the grow-
ing receptiveness of courts to hear challenges make a study of the justifi-
cations for such searches timely and important.
College Students, Constables, and Chancellors: A Brief Review
of Search and Seizure on Campus
Traditional Approaches
Historically, theories of contract,7 waiver,8 property rights,9 and
5. There are more than six million university students currently enrolled in
more than 2,000 American public and private institutions of higher learning. 1973
WORLD ALMANAC 303-26 (Delury ed.). Of this figure, the exact number of students
who will reside in a university dormitory or married student apartment is not known
with any precision. Some colleges, particularly small, private ones, require all students
to live in institutional housing. Large commuter colleges located in metropolitan
areas, on the other hand, may have no dormitory facilities at all. Probably between
one-third and one-half of all college students reside in a dormitory at some time in
their career.
6. Although expulsion from the university may sometimes have an effect as
severe as that of a criminal penalty, this article deals primarily with the criminal con-
sequences of warrantless, nonconsensual searches. A future article will consider the
relationship of such searches to academic disciplinary actions.
7. E.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); Sam-
son v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct.), affd
mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917); People ex reL Cecil v. Bellevue
Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
8. E.g., North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 306, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891);
see Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
9. E.g., People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967), vacated sub nom., Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968),
reinstated, People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479
(1969). But see Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949-
50 (D.S.C. 1967).
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in loco parentis"° have been used to limit or deny students' procedural
rights in campus disciplinary proceedings. Variants of these theories
have been cited by courts and commentators in an effort to circum-
scribe the rights of students under the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps
the most venerable of these is the doctrine of in loco parentis.
Many of the early cases, citing the doctrine of in loco parentis,
held that the legal relationship of university officials to students was
that of parent and child.11 It was said that in permitting the student
to enroll, the student's parents in effect delegated to school authorities
their power to supervise their child's activities.' 2  Because of the broad
powers parents have to supervise the activities of their minor children,
universities were not required to afford students the full range of rights
extended to adults under the Constitution. In particular, since parents
have the right to inspect the private rooms and areas of their depend-
ent children, 1 this right was thought to be transferred to university
authorities when the student entered school. One court went so far
as to say:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical
and moral welfare, and mental training of the pupils, and we are
unable to see why . . . they may not make any rules and regula-
tion for the government or betterment of their pupils that a par-
ent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or regulations
are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the discre-
tion of the authorities, or parents as the case may be. .... 14
Although governance by in loco parentis may still have some vi-
tality in the treatment of very young children, 15 it has fallen into dis-
10. E.g., Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); State ex rel.
Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150, 155-57 (1878); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 153(2)
(1934).
11. E.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Goodman
& Neiderhoffer, supra note 2, at 5-6.
12. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (1870).
13. Such searches are justified either by reference to the parent's supervisory
powers over the child's moral development. See Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d
636, 642, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1959); cf. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969),
or the parent's control and possession of the house; see Comment, 28 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 207, 211-13 (1971), and cases cited therein.
14. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) (em-
phasis added); cf. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct.
1971); note 12 supra. But see Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468
(1948) (in loco parentis authority only gives school power to act for the absent parent
in school related or academic functions).
15. Knowles, Crime Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional Dimensions,
4 J. FAMILY L. 151, 155-57 (1964).
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favor with respect to college students.'0 College students today are
generally more independent and older than in former years."7 Many
have attained the age of majority,' 8 while others have acquired the
status of emancipated minors. Because the doctrine of in loco parentis
rests on the fiction that parents transfer to the school supervisory
powers over their children,' 9 an educational institution can acquire no
authority in this manner where the students have reached the age of ma-
jority and are no longer under the legal supervision of their parents.
Even in the case of college students who are below the age of majority,
the applicability of the doctrine is unclear. Since In re Gault,20 consid-
erable caution is appropriate in approaching reduced forms of constitu-
tional protection for juveniles. Although Gault dealt with Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the close relationship
that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments historically have enjoyed 2'
should sound a cautionary note. Thus, it is not surprising that court
decisions in many jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine of in loco
parentis, while others have qualified it almost beyond recognition. 22
Other courts and commentators have sought to justify limitations
on the exercise of constitutional rights by reference to certain aspects
16. Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENvER L.J. 582,
590-92 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
17. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rlv. 1027, 1032
(1969).
18. Less than 4% of the United States college population is under 18 years of age.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1973 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
110-11. Although many universities attempt to maintain a "balanced" ratio of
freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors in the dormitories, it seems likely that the
population of dormitory residents is somewhat younger than that of undergraduates
generally. For example, at Berkeley, 51% of all dormitory residents in the fall of 1973
were freshmen, 18% were sophomores, 17% were juniors, 7% were seniors, and 5%
were graduate students. Interview with Mrs. Margaret Dewell, Supervisor, Housing
Office, University of California, in Berkeley, California, March 28, 1974. Nevertheless,
less than 3% of all undergraduates at Berkeley are under 18 years of age. Interview
with Ms. Liz Kearns, Office of Institutional Research, University of California, in
Berkeley, California, March 28, 1974. It seems probable that the proportion of under-
18 residents at the dormitories is quite small.
19. See note 12 supra.
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 597-98 (1904); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
22. See cases cited notes 28-34 infra. See also Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cali-
fornia, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876-77, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (1967); Van Alstyne,
Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers at Public Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 1 (1965).
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of the student's status as a university resident.2" One such aspect is
the landlord-tenant relationship. It is sometimes asserted that land-
lords have a common law right to enter tenants' property for various
purposes, such as to view waste or to effect repairs.24 Today, many
landlords reserve similar rights in the lease agreement. Because the
relationship of the university and the student resident is for some pur-
poses like that of landlord and tenant,25 it might be urged that the
student's right to be free from warrantless searches by university offi-
cials or campus police is limited by the university's interest in man-
aging the uses to which its own property is put.26
In general, however, even where private landlords have retained
a right to enter the premises of their tenants for a particular purpose,
they cannot use that power to make entries for other purposes, such
as to seize evidence of criminal activity. Neither can they consent
to warrantless searches of their tenants' premises by law enforcement
officers, "because of the greater danger in event of violation and the
additional element of state action, it seems improbable that courts
would treat university-landlords more leniently than private land-
lords."2  Certainly courts would not be expected to treat university
landlords more leniently.2 9
23. See, e.g., Humphreys v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (sug-
gests that a limitation on First Amendment rights of students at a state-supported uni-
versity might be a valid exercise of school's right to control its own property); Van
Alstyne, supra note 16, at 585.
24. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
25. See Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 588-89.
26. Numerous cases have relied on a governmental property interest in the area
searched to justify a warrantless, nonconsensual entry. E.g., United States v. Collins,
349 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652, 654-56
(4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921, 923-24 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
27. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616 (1961); cf. United States
v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). It should be added that the exclusionary
rule which has grown out of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against illegal searches
and seizures is inapplicable when the individual making the search is acting strictly as a
private individual and not as an agent of a governmental unit. Barnes v. United States,
373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097,
103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); Mercer v. Texas, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
(search by high school administrator of high school student not state action). For a
discussion on the degree of state action involved in searches and seizures of dormitory
rooms by private university officials, see Note, Admissibility of Evidence Seized by
Private University Officials in Violation of Fourth Amendment Standards, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 507 (1971).
28. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
29. In People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968),
the court noted that private university officials with a limited right of entry into dormi-
tory rooms could not delegate this right by consent to law enforcement personnel. Id.
[Vol. 26
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In general, solutions to search and seizure problems -that focus
on the status of the victim have incurred increasing judicial disfavor
in recent years.30 Distinctions for standing purposes among the rights
of guests, tenants, licensees, and invitees have been challenged; today,
it can be argued that anyone legitimately on the premises has standing
to object to the introduction of evidence against him that has been
obtained through an improper search.3' Consequently, the peculiar
relationship between student tenants and college administrators should
not afford the latter a right to search superior to that of the average
landlord who suspects his tenant may be engaged in illegal activity,
much less invest them with authority to make unannounced, warrant-
less searches for criminal evidence.
Another approach would seek to characterize students as an ex-
ceptional class under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-
ment, which provides for the right of the people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable [i.e., war-
at 709. The court impliedly compared university officials with landlords when it said:
' To suggest that a student who lives off campus in a boarding house is protected [by
the Fourth Amendment] but that one who occupies a dormitory room waives his con-
stitutional liberties is at war with reason, logic and law." Id. at 713. If a state-sup-
ported university were to attempt to reserve an unlimited right to enter students'
rooms, its action would undoubtedly be unconstitutional. The Fourth Amendment does
not distinguish between governmental and proprietary state action, and a state-sup-
ported university must abide by constitutional standards even when it acts in a pro-
prietary capacity. Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 589. Because of the increasing in-
terdependence of private universities and the federal government, and the heavily sub-
sidized nature of many academic research programs at private schools, state action can
probably be found even in non-public universities. Wright, The Constitution on Cam-
pus, 22 VAND. L. Rnv. 1027, 1035 (1969). See generally, Note, Admissibility of
Evidence Seized by Private University Officials in Violation of Fourth Amendment
Standards, 56 CORNELL L. Rnv. 507 (1971). State colleges, of course, have always
been regarded as governmental bodies. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d 150, 155-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 950 (1961).
30. E.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
31. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); see State v. Matias, 51
Haw. 62, 451 P.2d 257 (1969). The continued viability of Jones depends on the de-
gree to which the United States Supreme Court follows its recent holding in Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). In dictum the Court stated that the Jones auto-
matic standing rule may now be unnecessary in light of Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968). Without directly deciding this point, the Court arguably modified
Jones when it declared: "In deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that
there is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the defendants:
(a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (b) had
no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c) were not charged with
an offense that includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of
the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure." Id. at 229.
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rantless] searches and seizures,' 3' has been held to be subject to a
number of exceptions, such as stop-and-frisk searches,3 3 emergency
searches, 34 and searches of mobile premises.35  In earlier years stu-
dents appear to have been considered an additional exception to the
warrant requirement. Guarantees of due process were considered to
be waived by the student on entrance, sometimes on the theory that
attendance at a public university was a "privilege" to be granted or
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. By way of insuring this right the amendment set
out that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." Id. The amendment has been construed to be binding upon the
states, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), as has been the exclusionary rule, Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Probable cause has been defined by the Supreme Court
as facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and any other reasonably trust-
worthy information which would be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution
to believe that illegal property is to be found in a particular place. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924). The oath-or-affidavit requirement can
be satisfied by the personal observation of a police officer or other reliable affiant,
or the statement of an informer of demonstrated credibility. Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). The ultimate purpose of the Fourth Amendment has been con-
strued to be the protection of the privacy of citizens in the places reasonably expected
to be free from governmental intrusion. See cases cited note 1 supra. Since it is a
personal interest in privacy that the amendment sets out to protect rather than a prop-
erty interest, ownership of the property by someone other than its present occupant is
not dispositive. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); cf. Holzhey v.
United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955). Thus, the right has been held to apply
to boarding-house rooms, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), hotel
rooms, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), offices, United States v. Hagarty,
388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968), telephone booths, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), and other areas normally regarded as private. The intervention of a magis-
trate provided by the warrant requirement is considered an indispensable element in
ensuring that police searches are reasonable. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364, 371 (1968). Exceptions to the rule that all searches proceed only upon
possession of a warrant are few in number and limited in scope. See notes 33-35 &
accompanying text infra. Apart from these recognized classes of exceptions, all
searches conducted without probable cause and a warrant are prima facie unreasonable.
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). Some uncertainty still exists as to
which protective features of the Fourth Amendment apply to government officials who
are not police. See Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D. Me. 1970) (ex-
clusionary rule designed to curb abuses by police only, hence not applicable to searches
conducted by other government agents). But see Comment, The Fourth Amendment
and High School Students, 6 WILLAmEiTE L.J. 567 (1970), which argues that the
Fourth Amendment "applies" whenever a school official's acts constitute state action.
The remainder of this article assumes that the exclusionary rule is not automatically
applicable to material seized by state educational authorities.
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
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withheld by the state at its pleasure.30
Since then, however, -the Supreme Court has indicated that status
as a student, in itself, does not justify denial of basic liberties. West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,37 a school flag-salute case in-
volving the free exercise clause, stated this principle in unmistakable
terms:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects
the citizens against the state itself and all its creatures-Boards
of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, deli-
cate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.3 8
The same position has been articulated and reinforced by other fed-
eral 39 and Supreme Cour40 decisions, and today it seems well estab-
lished that students are "persons" under the Constitution. 41  Although
most of these cases have dealt with First Amendment and due proc-
ess rights, the variety of the contexts in which students' rights have
been upheld, the generality of the language, and the virtual unanimity
of judicial opinion justify the presumption that appellate courts will de-
cide search and seizure cases similarly. The handful of lower court
decisions that have dealt with the status of students under the Fourth
Amendment law support this presumption. 42  As has been pointed out
by other commentators, it makes little sense for courts to insist on due
process rights such as adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard,
if the student is permitted to arrive at his hearing with his substantive
rights irreversibly compromised as a result of an earlier illegal search.43
A related rationale for limiting a student's Fourth Amendment
rights focuses on the transience of student propulations and their rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. Apart from their status as students,
most residents of university dormitories form a highly mobile, shifting
population. With the exception of the relatively few universities that
require all students to reside in university owned housing, many
36. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
37. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38. Id. at 637.
39. E.g., Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala.,
1967).
40. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969).
41. Id. at 511.
42. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970);
People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 373, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (Dist. Ct. 1968).
43. E.g., Note, College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Prob-
lems on Campus, 3 GA. L. REV. 426, 440, 454-55 (1969).
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schools find that a sizeable proportion of dormitory residents remain
in the dormitory for only a few semesters. 44  Those students who do
remain from year to year rarely spend more than nine months at the
dormitory in a calendar year;" and even these students may change
rooms from year to year. If the transience of these students limits
their expectation of privacy, their right to the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment might be justifiably reduced.
Judicial opinion holds, however, that even temporary occupancy
of a room or other dwelling entitles the occupant to the benefit of
the Fourth Amendment. Eng Fung Jem v. United States,40 for ex-
ample, a federal court case arising from a California incident, involved
a search of the room of a short-term resident in a hotel for transients.
Without consent or a warrant, police officers entered the defendant's
room and found contraband. The court held that the brevity of the
guest's stay at the hotel did not justify relaxation of the requirements
of probable cause and a warrant. 47  The right of privacy was held
to apply "with equal vigor both to transient hotel guests and to occu-
pants of private, permanent dwellings. 4 8  Other cases also hold that
the duration of a resident's occupancy is not dispositive,49 and at least
one has explicitly declared that a dormitory room is comparable to an
apartment or hotel for Fourth Amendment purposes.5" Accordingly,
transience, like the theories considered earlier, offers little justification
for lowering the constitutional standard for searches of students' dorm-
itory rooms.
The Modern Housing Contract
Frequently, university housing contracts contain a provision per-
mitting college officials to enter the rooms of students at specified
times or for certain enumerated purposes.5 Because universities are
44. Interview with Mrs. L. Rawls, Housing Office, University of California, in
Berkeley, California, Feb. 2, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Rawls].
45. id.
46. 281 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960).
47. Id. at 805.
48. Id.
49. E.g., Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 249 (8th Cir. 1962) and cases
cited therein; see Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (hotel room held area
entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy); cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
265-66 (1960) (transient occupant of a dwelling held entitled to protection against
unreasonable search).
50. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
51. The provision in the contract used by the University of California at Berke-
ley is fairly illustrative: "(Sec. 7) DAMAGES. Residents are individually responsi-
ble for loss or damage to their rooms, and residents of a hall may be jointly held re-
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understandably anxious to avoid giving umversity residence a prison-
camp aura, they seldom feature such clauses prominently. 52 Instead,
these clauses may be placed in the section of the contract dealing with
damages or may be couched in the seemingly innocuous language of
a health and safety regulation.5 When a university seeks to rely on
such a contractual provision as effecting the waiver of a student's right
to protest searches of his room, obvious problems arise as to the con-
stitutional validity of the notice given and the informed nature of the
consent. 4 In practice, however, a major attraction for some univer-
sities in seeking to retain contractual rights to enter student rooms is
their belief that in so doing they may secure admission to student quar-
ters of agents of the campus or municipal police.55 At the University
of California, for example, the campus police operate under the as-
sumption that such a provision in the housing contract permits them
to enter students' rooms without benefit of a search warrant or prob-
able cause.5" These searches are possible because the university, hav-
sponsible for loss or damage to common areas. The University reserves the right to
enter a student room at any reasonable time for the purpose of health and safety in-
spection, maintenance or repair, except in the event of an emergency where immediate
access is necessary." Terms and Conditions of Residence, University Residence Halls,
Berkeley (1973). See also the regulation in use at Troy State University cited in
Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 625 (M.D. Ala. 1970), and the dormitory regu-
lation at California Institute of Technology in People v. Kelly, 195 Cal. App. 2d 669,
677, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (1961).
52. This practice has been observed and criticized by a number of commentators.
E.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 588; cf. Note, Judicial Review of the University-
Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 95, 104-05 (1973).
See Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
Ray. 368, 369-71 (1963), for discussion of the view that all student-university relations
are ultimately based on contract.
53. See notes 51-52 & accompanying text supra.
54. Constitutional rights may be waived in certain circumstances. There is a
strong presumption against such waiver, however, and instances of waiver are subjected
to strict scrutiny. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Waiver must be effected
knowingly, without coercion, and with knowledge of all relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. E.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Fourth
Amendment cases, consent to search has been held to have been vitiated by a showing
of deception, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), coercion, Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), or failure to realize the full implications of
consent, United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1961).
55. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1970); People
v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 373, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (Dist. Ct. 1968); People v.
Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1968), vacated sub nom.,
Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1965), reinstated, People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d
522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969).
56. The Daily Californian, Oct. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 3 (interview with campus
police officer in charge of patrolling residence units). See also Piazzola v. Watkins,
316 F. Supp. 624, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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ing retained the right to enter the rooms, has delegated that right to
the campus police.
This practice, although widespread, is of questionable legality.
Because a student's consent to enter involves some degree of forfeiture
of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, such consent must be narrowly
construed and its transference to governmental agents closely
watched. In similar circumstances, a landlord who exacts a contrac-
tual right to enter his tenants' premises may not delegate this right
to the police. 58 The same result is reached where a hotel desk clerk,
with implied consent to enter the guests' rooms for certain purposes,
may not transfer this right to the police without the guest's permis-
sion.59
Consent has been narrowly construed not only with respect to the
searcher, but with respect to the object of the search as well.6" In par-
ticular, when a consent clause is couched in terms of health and safety
inspections, consent to enter rooms for such inspections should not be
construed as conferring consent to enter for other reasons, such as to
investigate reports of illicit activity.
A recent New York case, People v. Cohen,6' illustrates the in-
creased willingness of courts to reject attempts to delegate search
rights.62 Declaring that a university "cannot fragmentize, share, or
delegate" its consent to enter students' rooms to the police, the court
ruled a police search of a student's quarters illegal and barred evidence
seized from admission in court. With respect to the informed nature
of the consent, the court said, "It offends reason and logic to suppose
that a student will consent to an entry . .. designed to establish
grounds upon which to arrest him."63
To be sure, the cases are not entirely uniform on this point, and
at least two significant opinions can be read to stand for the proposi-
tion that a school administrator may empower agents of the police to
search a student's personal area. In People v. Overton,64 a case in-
57. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
58. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
59. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
60. Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1970), citing with
approval United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
61. 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1st Dist. 1968).
62. Id. at 369, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
63. Id.
64. 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated sub nom.,
Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968), reinstated, People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d
522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969).
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volving a search of a students locker by police at the invitation of a
junior high school principal, the court held that the administrator had
the right to give consent to search. Although the opinion stated that
the search was justified by the principal's need to exercise supervision
over the students in his school,65 the analysis also proceeded on the
theory that the student whose locker was searched did not have exclu-
sive possession of it.66 The court observed:
It appears understood that the lock and the combination are pro-
vided in order that each student may have exclusive possession of
the locker vis-a-vis other students, but the student does not have
such exclusivity over the locker as against the school authorities.
. . . When [the school principal] learned of the detectives'
suspicion [that something illegal was secreted in the defendant's
locker], he was obligated to inspect the locker. This interest, to-
gether with the nonexclusive nature of the locker, empowered him
to consent to the search by the officers. 67
Although this case has been cited for the principle that school
authorities may permit police to search student-used premises, 68 this
formulation is undoubtedly too broad, particularly if sought to be ap-
plied to searches of the rooms and apartments of university students.
First, dormitory residents are more nearly the exclusive users of their
rooms -than locker users are of their lockers. Schools extend locker
privileges for the convenience of the students in storing books and
school materials. Assignment is informal, and the student may be re-
quired to vacate his locker or share it with another student at any time.
Locker use is ordinarily noncontractual and does not involve payment
of a fee. Dormitory residence, on the other hand, is contractual and
requires consideration. The space assigned does not ordinarily change
during the year,69 and students may not be compelled to share their
rooms with occupants beyond the number specified in the housing con-
tract.
70
65. Id. at 362, 229 N.E.2d at 597, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
66. Id. at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
67. Id.
68. E.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 626 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
69. At the University of California in Berkeley, for example, students are oc-
casionally asked to move from one room to another in the same unit, for administrative
reasons or for ease of maintenance. This happens relatively rarely, however, and is
seldom protested by the students involved. Students cannot be required to move from
their room to a room in another unit. Students asked to relocate must be given rea-
sonable advance notice. Interview with Mrs. Margaret Dewell, Supervisor, Housing
Office, University of California, in Berkeley, Califor-ia, Mar. 25, 1974.
70. A dormitory resident at Berkeley, for example, cannot be compelled to ac-
cept additional roommates beyond the number specified in his or her contract. If a
vacancy occurs in a double-occupancy room, the remaining resident can be required to
Moreover, the expectation of privacy in dormitory rooms is con-
siderably higher than in the case of lockers. Lockers are generally
located in public areas such as hallways where their contents are ex-
posed to the view of passersby whenever the user opens the door.'
Lockers are intended to serve as receptacles for books, supplies, and
other impersonal item, whereas dormitory rooms provide an area of
repose and privacy where students may rest, sleep, undress, and con-
verse. The rationale of locker search cases may thus be inapplicable
to searches of dormitory rooms. 2
A second decision calling into question the availability of Fourth
Amendment protections in connection with student dormitory rooms
is People v. Kelly.7 3 This case involved a warrantless, nonconsensual
search of a student's quarters by the police and the dormitory master.
Holding that the search was valid, the California appellate court relied
on a theory of apparent authority or reasonable behef:74 because the
police reasonably believed that the dormitory master had the right to
permit them to enter the student's room, the search was reasonable. 5
The holding of the case is obscured, however, beoause the search was
conducted incident to a lawful arrest,76 and also because the searching
parties incorrectly believed that any crime constituted an emergency
which in turn justified suspension of the warrant requirement.7 7  More-
over, since Kelly was decided, the "reasonable belief' justification for
police searches has been cut back so severely by the Supreme Court7 s
that Kelly today may be said to have at best a very limited vitality.
The Housing Contract as a Contract of Adhesion
Where the parties to a contract are markedly unequal in bargain-
ing power, courts have refused to give effect to their agreeement when
necessary to protect the interest of the weaker party. Among such
"contracts of adhesion," particularly suspect are contracts in which the
accept another roommate, subject to the university's policy of attempting to match
preferences for roommates. Id.
71. Objects in "plain view" are subject to seizure by an officer who has a right
to be in position to view them. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
72. Only areas entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy are protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. 195 Cal. App. 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961).
74. Id. at 680, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
75. Id. at 678, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
76. Id. at 679, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
77. Id. at 677, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 181-83.
78. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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superior party has a monopoly on a necessary commodity and is in
a position to dictate terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.7 9  Universal
employment of a standard contract by major suppliers of a commodity
can also trigger close scrutiny because a consumer who desires to ob-
tain the product must accept the terms of the contract, or do without.80
All these factors are present to some degree in university housing con-
tracts. Inexpensive housing is in short supply in most university com-
munities.81 The college, as a major supplier, is in a position of relative
power vis-a-vis the student. The clause appears in all housing con-
tracts offered by -the university. 2  There is no opportunity for arm's-
length bargaining. 83
Under such circumstances courts have nullified agreements in or-
der to protect the weaker party.84 While the classic cases of contracts
of adhesion have arisen in commercial contexts, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that courts will proteot the student's interest, a basic constitutional
liberty, with at least the same solicitude with which they have pro-
tected the interests of consumers in -the well-known cases of auto-
mobile warranties and insurance contracts.8 5
79. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
80. Id.
81. Rawls, supra note 44.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
85. Indeed, given the significance of the right at stake, the disparity between the
power of the contracting student and that of the state-supported university may attain
constitutional dimensions. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
state may not, absent compelling justification, extend public benefits on condition that
the recipient agree to forfeit a constitutionally protected interest. See, e.g., Spevak
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966). While the doctrine has been applied most frequently
in connection with welfare, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and em-
ployment, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), problems, lower
courts have on occasion invoked it in dealing with school-related cases, e.g., West Vir-
ginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156-58 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). If, as
has been urged, dormitory residence is an integral part of a college education, Fatzer v.
Board of Regents of State of Kansas, 167 Kan. 587, 207 P.2d 373 (1949), the school
may not utilize its power to dispense this benefit in such a way as to deprive students
of their right to be free from unauthorized searches. Particularly in view of the rapid
growth of public housing, see Franklin, Federal Power and Subsidized Housing, 3 J.
URnAN L. 61 (1971), which opens up large areas in which coercive contracts could be
used to negate constitutional guarantees, courts are likely to be reluctant to set prece-
dent permitting such contracts.
Moreover, in drawing a line between students who live in dormitories and suffer
reduced Fourth Amendment protection and students who live off campus and receive
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The Status of the Searcher: College Administrators, College
Students, and the Fourth Amendment
As justifications for police searches, each of the theories consid-
ered in the preceding section suffered from serious defects. As a re-
sult it might appear that student residents stand on a par with citizens
generally with respect ,to search and seizure law and that all its protec-
tive features, including the right to exclude illegally seized evidence,
are available to students as well. Although the law seems to be mov-
ing in this direction, a recent, influential, and somewhat anomalous
line of cases from the Alabama federal courts have made it evident
that this is not yet the case.
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University6
involved a warrantless search by university officials and police of de-
fendant Moore's room. Contraband was found, and the student was
expelled. In rejecting the student's application for relief and uphold-
ing the search, the federal district court cited a number of cases involv-
ing the national security in which searches by a superior were held
full protection, university housing practices may result in a distinction so artificial as to
invite attack on orthodox equal protection grounds. Particularly where-as at Berkeley
and other metropolitan universities--dormitories and private dwellings exist side-by-
side in the same neighborhoods, there is little justification for permitting students in
one building to enjoy full Fourth Amendment rights while students in a virtually
identical highrise complex next door receive only limited protection. The constitution-
ality of such a practice becomes even more suspect when it is realized that often the
factor that determines whether a student resides in a dormitory or private quarters is
financial. Generally, dormitory living is cheap and convenient. Minority students are
accepted without question. As a result, dormitories attract many students who are
poor, of minority races, on scholarships, or self-supporting. Students who live in more
expensive apartments, on the other hand, tend to come from more affluent families.
Rawls, supra note 44. Wealth thus emerges as the decisive criterion; wealthy students
have greater freedom from warrantless searches than students with a more restricted in-
come.
Wealth appears to be receiving greater attention in recent years as a possible sus-
pect classification. See generally, Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. Rav. 1065, 1121-32 (1969). Regulations imposing wealth-based burdens
have been struck down in a variety of contexts, including the right to vote, Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); to appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956); and to receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system, Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971). Although there is some question whether wealth alone, absent a
fundamental interest, suffices to trigger strict judicial scrutiny, San Antonio Independ-
ent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), there is little doubt that freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental interest. In view of these
developments it would be consistent with current trends for courts to strike down regu-
lations at state-supported universities that afforded protection from unreasonable
searches to some, but not all students.
86. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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reasonable. 7  After weighing the needs of the university to govern
effectively against the student's right to privacy, the court concluded
that the university had an inherent right of reasonable inspection as
part of its responsibility to preserve order and discipline on campus. 88
A school regulation or practice permitting campus officials to search
student rooms upon "reasonable cause" was thus a legitimate exercise
of their authority. 9  The standard to be employed in such searches-
reasonable cause-is somewhat lower than that of probable cause, 90
and a search warrant is evidently not necessary. 91
The court in Moore did not consider the extent to which univer-
sity officials might delegate or transfer their right to search to the po-
lice. This question was resolved a short time later in Piazzola v. Wat-
kins.92  Here, the same federal court that decided Moore was con-
fronted with a case in which the state university had reserved a right
to enter dormitory rooms for inspection purposes as a condition of
rental. Without probable cause, consent, or a warrant, the local police
raided a student's dormitory room and discovered a quantity of mari-
juana. Even though the police had searched on the express invitation
of university authorities, the court held the search unconstitutional and
barred introduction of the marijuana in court.93 The court said that
while universities may have a right to conduct searches for institutional,
college-related reasons, this right does not extend to searches con-
ducted in order to seize criminal evidence.94  With regard to the dele-
gation issue left open by Moore, the court held that "the fact that the
college has this right [to search]-for a restricted purpose-does not
mean that the college may exercise the right by admitting a third
party.
95
87. Id. at 731 n.12. The cases cited were United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d
863 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1966).
88. 284 F. Supp. at 730.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Despite the failure of university authorities to obtain a search warrant in
advance of the search, id. at 728, the search was upheld. Id. at 730.
92. 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
93. Id. at 628.
94. The right to search "cannot be expanded and used for purposes other than
those pertaining to the special relationship." Id. Interpretation of these purposes is
to be made in terms of the institution's need "to operate the school as an educational
institution." Id., citing Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).
95. Id. at 628.
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In arriving at this result, the court in Piazzola cited with approval
the opinion in United States v. Blok,96 another federal court case,
which concerned a police search of a government employee's desk
with the consent of her supervisor. In Blok, the supervisor had an
uncontested right to search the employee's desk for administrative rea-
sons97 similar to those cited in Moore. Nevertheless, the court held
that consent by the superior did not render the police search constitu-
tional because "[o]peration of [the agency] and enforcement of the
criminal law do not amalgamate to give a right of search beyond the
scope of either." ' The court also found that
[i]n the absence of a valid regulation to the contrary appellee was
entitled to, and did, keep private property of a personal sort in
her desk. Her superiors could not reasonably search her desk
[for items having] no connection with the work of the office.
Their consent did not make such a search by the police reason-
able.99
Accordingly, even after Moore and Piazzola, a university's right
to conduct searches is not unlimited. Administrative searches of stu-
dent quarters must be conducted by campus officials, who cannot dele-
gate their authority to the police.' Warrantless searches based on
the reduced standard of reasonable cause must be made only for insti-
tutional reasons' 0 1 and not for the furtherance of enforcement gener-
ally.
96. 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
97. Id. at 1021.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. A variation of this problem would arise if a university were to appoint a
campus police officer to an administrative position, such as dean, in the university.
Such a figure would in a sense "wear two hats." If the school were to dispatch this
person to investigate reports of suspicious activity in a student's room, what standard
of search would be applicable? Although there appear to be no cases on record, it
seems likely that the standard would depend on the event that gave rise to the search
and the motives of the university in carrying out the search. See Contreras v. United
States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961) (immigration officer who evidently also acted as
an agent of the Bureau of Customs could not use administrative standards appropriate
to customs searches to inspect personal effects of alien stopped 72 miles within border
on suspicion of illegal entry); Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F.2d 1170
(9th Cir. 1970) (immigration official barred from introducing evidence obtained from
six-inch recess in automobile, since no illegal alien could reasonably have been sus-
pected to be hiding in recess of this size); Comment, In Search of the Border: Searches
Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
93, 104-05 (1972).
101. Narrow construction of the scope of special administrative searches is the
rule. United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968); see, Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960).
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College Law Versus the Fourth Amendment: A New
Variety of Administrative Search?
Earlier, a number of -theories were considered that purported to
justify searches of student quarters without regard to normal Fourth
Amendment standards.10 2  Each of these theories effected a waiver
of the searched person's Fourth Amendment rights based on that per-
son's status.10 3  In each theory, students were viewed as having waived
to some extent their Fourth Amendment rights as a result of some
aspect of their relationship with school administrators. As was seen,
none of these theories provided a satisfactory basis for searches con-
ducted without a warrant or consent. Next, a rationale based on the
status of 'the searcher was analyzed."0 4 This approach, exemplified
by the solution propounded in Moore and Piazzola, essentially results
in an administrative search, 0 5 like those approved by the Supreme
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court"6 and See v. City of Seattle.1 7
In Camara and See, administrative officers were permitted to enter
homes or businesses by satisfying a reduced standard of probable
cause.' 08 In arriving at this result, the Court employed a process of
balancing in which the public interest favoring the search was weighed
against the victim's interest in privacy.' Because the inspector's ob-
jective is the enforcement of an administrative regulation rather than
the criminal law, and because his entry is only minimally intrusive,
limited in scope, and relatively nonthreatening, it was appropriate for
him to enter premises under more permissive procedures than those
used by police officers conducting searches for criminal evidence. In
these cases and those that followed there appears to be an inverse rela-
tionship between the innocuousness of the search and the readiness
102. The theories reviewed were in loco parentis, student status as an exempt
class, the landlord-tenant relationship, transience, and the housing contract. See notes
11-85 & accompanying text supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 11-85 supra.
104. See notes 86-101 and accompanying text supra.
105. E.g., Bible, The College Dormitory Student and the Fourth Amendment-A
Sham or a Safeguard, 4 U.S.F.L. REV. 49, 54-63 (1969), which criticizes the Moore
decision for creating a new variety of administrative exception lacking the safeguards,
especially the requirement of a search warrant, laid down by the Supreme Court in
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967).
106. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
107. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
108. 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
109. Id. at 537. See generally Greenberg, The Balance of Interest Theory and the
Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara
and See, 61 CAm. L. RE'. 1011, 1011-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
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of courts to sanction a partial waiver, or lowering, of the victim's
Fourth Amendment protections."' The more "administrative" the
search, the lower the waiver threshold; conversely, the more police-
like the search, the more rigorously Fourth Amendments standards are
applied."' This relationship becomes especially significant in college
searches because, as will be seen in the next section, supervision of
student conduct at many universities is carried out by an elaborate
hierarchy of authorities, ranging from student dormitory assistants to
college deans and the campus police. A case study will examine in
detail the functioning of the various levels of enforcement personnel
at an illustrative university, the University of California at Berkeley.
It will be seen that each type of administrator occupies a distinctive
position in a spectrum of potential searchers which is bounded by pure
law enforcement operatives at one end and by exclusively administra-
tive functionaries at the other. This part concludes by discussing two
recurring strategies by which some university authorities have sought
to exploit the advantages of Moore-Piazzola administrative searches to
facilitate the objective of criminal enforcement.
Case Study of a Campus Disciplinary Hierarchy:
The University of California
Campus Police
At Berkeley, as at most universities, the campus police have the
full status of peace officers under state law." 2 Their powers are iden-
tical with those of the police in the California cities of Oakland, Berke-
ley, and Albany with whom they share partially overlapping geographi-
cal jurisdictions. 1  The campus police make arrests, issue citations,
serve warrants, and carry arms just as municipal police do."' Unlike
officers of city police forces, however, the campus police are employed
not by a political subdivision of the state but by the Regents of the
110. Greenberg, supra note 109, at 1016.
111. Id.
112. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23501 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. PEN. CODE § 830.2(d)
(West Supp. 1974). See California Monthly, March 1973, at 6, col. 3 [hereinafter
cited as California Monthly]. In a recent survey, 70% of all colleges had campus police
with authority to make arrests. The rest had private guards or maintained close re-
lations with local municipal police. Berman, Law and Order on Campus: An Analysis
of the Role and Problems of the Security Police, 49 J. URBAN L. 513, 519 (1971).
113. Interview with Lt. John Anderson, Berkeley campus policy officer in charge
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University. 115 Their territorial jurisdiction includes the campus, cer-
tain grounds and properties located outside the campus proper, and
territory located within a radius of one mile of the campus." 6 In
Berkeley, Albany, and Oakland, primary jurisdiction over certain areas
is governed by agreements between the campus police and the police
of these municipalities.117  Telegraph Avenue,11 8 for example, is un-
der the concurrent jurisdiotion of the Berkeley city police and the
campus police, while Albany Village, a large tract of married student
housing located three miles northwest of the university, is under the
jurisdiction of the Albany police." 9
The campus police at Berkeley make approximately 500 arrests
per year, 20 most of them for possessing or selling drugs, disturbing
the peace, and shoplifting. 12' Although only a small fraction of these
arrests result from searches of student dormitory rooms or apart-
ments, 2 2 searches of these areas yield a high rate of arrest and con-
viction. 23  Despite this high success rate, the campus police express
reluctance to conduct such searches unless absolutely necessary. 24
They feel such searches interfere with the "service" image they strive
to project. 2 5 Accordingly, dormitory residents are encouraged to
"police themselves" so as to minimize the need for police intrusions,2 6
and the police "work with" key dormitory personnel in developing
means for coping with antisocial activity or petty crime through coun-
seling and peer pressure.12 7
115. Id.
116. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 23501 (West Supp. 1974). California Monthly, supra
note 112, at 6, col. 1; Anderson supra note 113.
117. California Monthly, supra note 112, at 6, col. 1. This is evidently a fairly
common practice. Campus police often work in collaboration with local municipal
police. Goodman & Neiderhoffer, supra note 2, at 7.
118. Telegraph Avenue, scene of many of Berkeley's well-known demonstrations,
is today the home of large numbers of drug peddlers, "street people," and runaway
youths. Berkeley city and campus police consider it a high-crime area and keep it un-
der constant surveillance. Anderson, supra note 113.
119. Id.
120. California Monthly, supra note 112, at 6, col. 2.
121. Anderson, supra note 113.
122. Id.
123. For example, in the first quarter of the current year there were five such
searches; each resulted in a lawful arrest. Id.
124. For a study of the ambivalent quality of campus-police relationships, see
Goodman & Neiderhoffer, supra note 2, at 5-8.
125. Interview with Campus Police Chief William Beall, in Berkeley, California,
Feb. 12, 1973.
126. Id.
127. Anderson, supra note 113. Evidently, many universities desire to minimize
the visibility of any police presence on campus. Cf. Berman, Law and Order on
The reluctance of the campus police to enter and search student
areas runs counter to a recent movement to abolish the "double stand-
ard" of treatment.'28 Until fairly recently, a student apprehended by
the police for a minor offense could expect to be referred to the dean
for a lecture, while nonstudents arrested for the same offense were
dealt with through the criminal justice system.' 2  Today, however, the
campus police attempt to treat all offenders-students and nonstudents
-alike. Since police ordinarily display little reluctance about entering
the quarters of the average criminal suspect in search of evidence of
crime, the disinclination on the part of campus police to enter student
rooms is somewhat surprising. Their reluctance may well be a product
of economic pressures. In recent years, the university has had diffi-
culty in keeping the residence halls filled to capacity. 3 Institutional
living is evidently unattractive to many of today's independent-minded
students, with the result that the demand is often insufficient to fill the
halls. 131 Vacancies cause a loss of income that must be made up from
the general university budget. As a result, university authorities have
an interest in avoiding actions that could make students more reluctant
to choose to live in the residence halls. "If we hassle the kids," one
housing officer reported, "they won't want to live in the dormitories
any more.' 32
Housing Office Personnel
Residence halls at Berkeley have a standard staffing pattern of
four student workers, called Residents, per hall. 3' Each Resident re-
ceives free room and board at the dormitory and, in some cases, a
small salary in return for overseeing the physical plant, providing
supervision of the students, and administering health and safety require-
ments.134  Announced fire and safety inspections of students' rooms
Campus: An Analysis of the Role and Problems of the Security Police, 49 J. URBAN L.
513, 520 (1971).
128. California Monthly, supra note 112, at 6, col. 2. For a discussion of the
double standard of treatment, see Van Alstyne, supra note 16.
129. Van Alstyne, supra note 16. This change in attitude has been observed at a
number of American universities. Goodman & Neiderhoffer, supra note 2, at 10.
130. Interview with Mrs. L. Rawls, Housing Office, University of California, in
Berkeley, California, Mar. 14, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Rawls fl].
131. Id. See also the discussion of the effect of economic class on student hous-
ing patterns in note 85 supra.
132. Rawls II, supra note 130.
133. University of California Residential Programs (March 9, 1973) (Personnel
brochure).
134. Id.
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are carried out at stated intervals. 135  Unannounced entries are evi-
dently left to the discretion of the individual Resident.13 6 One housing
officer reported that the Residents have keys to students' rooms and
are authorized to enter when there is a disturbance or a report of cri-
minal activity.137  She estimated that such unannounced, warrantless
searches occur at a rate of about one per week.' 33 Another hous-
ing official stated that Residents try to minimize the frequency with
which they enter students' rooms.' 39 The primary emphasis, she said,
is on counseling potential offenders; entries are made only when this
process fails to secure compliance.'40 An informant who serves as a
Senior Resident Assistant at a dormitory for women confirmed that a
wide variation exists among the Residents regarding searches of stu-
dents' rooms.' 4 ' When a report of minor criminal conduct is received,
some Residents promptly enter the room and investigate, while others
resort to admonition and counseling.'12 Most Residents, she said, would
call the police only in an emergency or if all other measures had
failed.' 43
Significantly, married student housing is more frequently sub-
jected to warrantless entries by university officers and police. 14  Al-
though some of these entries are apparently only routine "baby-
checks," it appears that married student apartments are entered and
searched more frequently for other purposes as well.' 45 Unlike dormi-
tory housing, married student apartments are in great demand;46 thus
the university may not feel much economic pressure to extend the per-
missive policy it applies to dormitory rooms to married students quar-
ters.
In general, however, searches of student quarters at Berkeley
seem to be a politically and economically sensitive function thtt no
one in the university hierarchy is especially anxious to assume. Al-
135. Interview with Faye Harris, Housing Office, University of California, in




139. Rawls 11, supra note 130.
140. Id.
141. Interview with Miss Jennifer Gee, Senior Hall Advisor, in Berkeley, Cali-
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though rooms are searched and students arrested, there appears to be
a generalized wish that this were not necessary, a reluctance to con-
front the necessity squarely, and a tendency to place the responsibility
for doing so upon someone else. The net effect is -that investigative
functions at the university are carried out, often reluctantly, by many
levels of personnel who are not police. Students live in an amorphous
situation in which virtually every university representative with whom
they come in contact is part of a large, ill-defined group charged with
policing their behavior. The nature of a student's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures in such an environment presents
Fourth Amendment issues that are both novel and important.
Searches by Friends of the Police: The Agency Doctrine
The most significant deterrent of illegal searches and seizures is
the exclusionary rule, which bars introduction of illegally seized evi-
dence in criminal 147 and certain administrative148 proceedings. The
rule was designed primarily as a means of discouraging illegal police
searches;149 it does not, however, bar evidence seized by civilians and
voluntarily surrendered to the police. 50  This limitation was first ar-
ticulated in Burdeau v. McDowell,'5' a Supreme Court case in which
private books and papers had been confiscated by agents of a corpora-
tion and submitted to federal prosecutors. Because the seizure had
taken place without the participation or knowledge of the authorities
and because the Fourth Amendment was only applicable to "the sover-
eign," the defendant's request for suppression was denied. 52
147. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
148. See Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968); Comment,
17 U. KANS. L. REv. 512, 528 (1969). For the view that the exclusionary rule should
be in effect in all proceedings wherein the government seeks to put in evidence material
illegally seized by a governmental official, see Sutherland, Use of Illegally Seized Evi-
dence in Non-Criminal Proceedings, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 215 (1966). A 1962 survey
disclosed that almost one-half of all universities permitted use of improperly acquired
evidence in disciplinary hearings. Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 368, 369 (1962).
149. See note 32 supra.
150. This is the traditional view, which has recently begun to draw fire from
commentators. See, e.g., Sutherland, Use of Illegally Seized Evidence in Non-Criminal
Proceedings, 4 CRiM. L. BULL. 215, 229 (1968), which argues that since the Fourth
Amendment is not directed so much negatively as a limitation on governmental initia-
tive as affirmatively as a protection of the individual's right of privacy, the exclusionary
rule should be applied to any illegal invasion, whether at the hands of governmental
figures or private trespassers. At present, however, the only remedy for an improper
search by a civilian acting independently is a tort action for trespass or invasion of
privacy.
151. 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
152. Id. at 476.
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At the time Burdeau was decided, "the sovereign" was under-
stood to refer only to the federal government. This limitation per-
mitted a practice that came to be known as the "silver platter" doc-
trine, 53 in which state authorities were permitted to perform illegal
searches and to turn over to federal prosecutors any evidence discov-
ered. Elkins v. United States 4 overturned this practice, and Mapp
v. Ohio55 extended the exclusionary rule to the states. Thus, by the
early 1960's the rule had developed that neither state nor federal po-
lice could profit from the fruits of their illegal searches or entries, but
they could profit from the fruits of such searches when these were
conducted by civilians. 56
When a citizen has conducted a search independently of govern-
mental agents, the courts have generally allowed law enforcement of-
ficers to use evidence found in such searches even though the citizen
stood in a custodial or quasi-enforcement capacity with respect to the
person searched.1 57 In Barnes v. United States,158 for example, a mo-
tel operator, in searching the room of a guest, found forged checks
which he gave to the police. The court upheld admission of the forged
checks on the civilian-search theory." 9 Again, in People v. Ran-
dazzo, 60 a store detective, peering into the women's dressing room,
spied the defendant concealing shoplifted goods. Although the dress-
ing room probably qualified as an area in which the woman had a
reasonable expectation of privacy,' 6 ' the court refused to suppress the
evidence, holding that the acts of the privately employed detective did
not fall within the scope of the exclusionary rule. 6 2
Such a rule exempting searches by persons other than govern-
mental agents has an obvious potential for abuse; 63 this limitation can
create, in effect, a new silver platter doctrine in which citizens sym-
153. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949).
154. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
155. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
156. For the view that the foundations of Burdeau have been eroded by Elkins
and Mapp v. Ohio, see Sutherland, Use of Illegally Seized Evidence in Non-Criminal
Proceedings, 4 Chm. L. BULL. 215, 215-22 (1968).
157. But see State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971) which held that
the admission of evidence seized by a private citizen in violation of defendant's right of
privacy was improper.
158. 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967).
159. Id. at 518.
160. 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963).
161. See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
162. 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963).
163. For examples of criticisms that have been levelled at the private-citizen
exception, see notes 150 & 156 supra.
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pathetic to law enforcement perform constitutionally suspect searches
for the benefit of the police. In response to this danger, court deci-
sions have developed the principle that when a civilian acts on behalf
of the police, an agency relationship is created and the search falls
within the exclusionary rule.
In Stapelton v. Superior Court,' the defendant was wanted for
credit card fraud. An agent of the credit card company accompanied
police to the defendant's home, where he was arrested. While the
police were occupied inside the home, the company's agent went out-
side to the defendant's car and searched it, finding contraband. The
California Supreme Court held that the involvement of the civilian in
planning and executing -the operation was so substantial as to render
it a joint affair.'65 The civilian's search of the car was thus tainted
by official involvement and, because the raid was found to be constitu-
tionally deficient, the evidence obtained in the search of the car was
suppressed. 166 In dictum, the court in Stapleton warned that searches
by private police -and investigators could present serious problems. 6 7
Such searches constitute a growing threat to privacy, and when they
are performed with a view to assisting the government to enforce the
criminal law, they should be subject to ordinary Fourth Amendment
strictures.
To illustrate the "minimal" level of governmental participation re-
quired to bring cooperative action within the purview of the Constitu-
tion, the court cited 68 United States v. Price, 69 a southern lynching
case in which the presence of a single federal marshal in a lynch mob
was enough to establish the requisite "state action" and to allow the
application of constitutional remedies. The California court also ap-
proved the decision in a state court case 71 in which official involve-
ment had been found when -a policeman "silently stood by" while a
civilian performed a search, thereby becoming a "willing but silent
beneficiary" of the search. Other cases have suggested that mere
knowledge on the part of the police that an illegal search was being
conducted for their benefit will result in application of the exclusionary
rule.'
7 1
164. 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968).
165. Id. at 102, 447 P.2d at 970, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 100-01 n.3, 447 P.2d at 969 n.3, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 577 n.3.
168. Id. at 101, 447 P.2d at 970, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
169. 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
170. Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960).
171. People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).
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In determining the degree of police involvement ina -a civilian
search, courts have assigned considerable weight to -the motivation of
the person conducting the search. In Gold v. United States,' 72 for ex-
ample, a federal district court considered a case in which police had
advised an airline manager of their belief that a certain package con-
tained contraband. The police, however, had avoided asking the man-
ager to open the package. Later, 'he opened the package, discovered
that it contained illegal material and called the police. In upholding
the search the court emphasized that the manager's inspection had
been carried out some time after the consultation with the police and
had been spurred by "reasons of his own," i.e., the manager's interest
in detecting mislabelling of the package, whioh would have affected
the freight charge.173 Because the manager had searched for 'his own
reasons rather than from a desire to help the police, the search fell
under -the category of civil searches and the exclusionary rule was held
inapplicable.17 4  By contrast, in Corngold v. United States,175 airline
authorities 'had searched a parcel at the direct request of government
agents. Even though a clause in the shipping contract gave the airline
the right to search any package, the court held ithat instigation of the
search by the police removed it from the classification of civil searches,
and the evidence was excluded. 176
Applying the principles of these oases to the various levels of uni-
versity personnel 'who conduct searches of student rooms, a number
of conclusions begin to emerge. First, -the campus police clearly fall
within the range of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.
Even at campuses where the police are not designated as peace officers
under state law,17 7 their objectives and methods of operation are so
similar to those of conventional police as to bring 'them within ordinary
Fourth Amendment strictures. 178 The common practice of dividing
territories and sharing responsibility for certain areas with local munici-
pal police forces would also tend to bring campus police under the
agency rule.'79
With respect to 'housing officials and university deans, a similar
finding seems indicated. At universities such as Berkeley, where ad-
172. 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
173. Id. at 591.
174. Id. at 591, 594.
175. 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
176. Id. at 5.
177. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 113 & 117-18 supra.
ministrators carry out preliminary investigations and summon the po-
lice only when hard evidence of criminal activity is discoverediso and
where the police encourage this type of action,181 full Fourth Amend-
ment standards seem appropriate. Except in cases where the univer-
sity can demonstrate independent, school-related "reasons of its own"
for such searches,1 2 courts would be expected to find an agency rela-
tionship.
With regard to searches conducted by student Residents, the con-
clusion is not so clear. The agency principle was formulated in order
to deny any benefit to the prosecution from evidence obtained by civil-
ian confederates. 183  From one point of view that is what the student
Residents are, and their desire to deal with problems themselves, at
least in the early stages, tends to support this conclusion.' Many
student Residents are anti-police in their attitudes, 8 5 however, and
perform police-like duties out of a desire to minimize police presence
in the areas in which they live.' 86 Arguably, when student Residents
assume police responsibilities in the hope of avoiding police interven-
tion, they are functioning like private detectives who search for reasons
of their own. 18 7
For most levels of university personnel, however, the creation of
a nebulous, university-wide family of police-like operatives provides
no short-cut for searches that do not comport with Fourth Amendment
standards. When police work is carried out by persons who are not
police, courts have been quick to expand the area of constitutional pro-
tection by means of agency principles to take account of each new
level of operation. 8
Apart from its questionable legal effect, delegating authority to
search student quarters to civilian campus personnel may be poor pol-
icy. Inexperienced personnel lacking even the beginning patrolman's
180. See text accompanying notes 126, 130-32 & 140-44 supra. These attitudes
on the part of administrators are evidently not uncommon, cf. Goodman & Neiderhof-
fer, supra note 2, at 9-10.
181. See text accompany notes 126-27 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 173-75 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 167-71 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 139-43 supra.
185. Interview with Miss Jennifer Gee, Senior Hall Advisor, in Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, Apr. 3, 1973.
186. Id.
187. See notes 172-76 & accompanying text supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 156-76 supra.
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rudimentary knowledge of the rights of criminal defendants18 9 may ex-
pose the university to suit for invasion of privacy and false arrest.
On balance, universities may find that their best interest is not served
by encouraging peculiarly police-like functions to be carried out by
persons who are not police.
Maximizing Police Access by Attempted Delegation of
the Right to Search
Not all universities are anxious to minimize police presence on
campus. Some, such as the state university in Piazzola, 90 may at
times actively desire to have municipal police come onto the campus
in response to some perceived threat. Indeed, they may wish to facili-
tate the effectiveness of the police while they are on the campus.'
Some officers, like the administrator in Piazzola who accompanied po-
lice during a raid of students' rooms, may be under the impression that
by inviting the police to carry out searches, -they can delegate to the
police the right to search student rooms without a search warrant and
with a showing of mere reasonable cause. 92 This approach, however,
was rejected by the court in Piazzola,93 which held that colleges are
permitted to perform administrative searches only because of the less
threatening, narrower, and less intrusive nature of the search.1 94  At-
tempts to share this power with others whose purpose is less benign
frustrate the end for which the doctrine was designed. Consequently,
Piazzola held, the right to search without a warrant may not be shared
with the police, 95 and college searches may be conducted only for in-
stitutional purposes. 196
Ascertaining what reasons are institutional reasons, however, is
not always a simple matter. When State University hears a report that
Abigail Jones has stolen books from a store downtown, does the uni-
versity have a sufficient reason of its own to institute an administrative
search? What if the books had been stolen from the campus library,
189. See generally Vandall, Training to Meet the Police Function, 1971 Wisc.
L. REv. 547.
190. See notes 92-93 & accompanying text supra.
191. Schools having this attitude toward police presence are discussed in Goodman
& Neiderhoffer, supra note 2, at 9-10.
192. See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra. This is the lower standard ap-
proved in Moore.
193. See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
194. See notes 95-99 & accompanying text supra. See generally notes 106-09 &
accompanying text supra.
195. See text accompanying notes 95 & 99 supra.
196. See notes 94 & 97 & accompanying text supra. See generally notes 106-11 &
accompanying text supra.
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violating both a criminal statute and a campus rule? Although air-
line197 and store detective cases 9 " can provide helpful principles for
distinguishing between institutional searches and those contaminated
by law enforcement motives, there exists relatively little case law about
college searches that is squarely on point. A leading commentator,
however, has advanced a set of guidelines in another context that may
prove helpful.
In a recent article, Professor Van Alstyne has suggested a two-
fold test' 99 for determining whether an offense is sufficiently campus-
related to warrant university disciplinary action in place of, or in addi-
tion to, treatment by the criminal courts. The first step is to determine
whether the university has a clearly distinguishable and separate inter-
est in penalizing the conduct, an interest that is not already served
by the penal statute. If there is no interest apart from the traditional
interests of deterrence, retribution, and so on that undergird the crim-
inal law, then the only type of offense that warrants separate univer-
sity discipline is one that poses a threat to the functioning of the uni-
versity as an academic institution. Thus, an offense that is already
adequately punishable by the criminal law and that does not threaten
the well-being of the university community should not be made the
object of separate campus disciplinary proceedings.
This test, designed to evaluate the need for disciplinary action,
can also help determine the appropriateness of administrative search
procedures, since offenses that warrant only campus discipline are
probably identical to those that could be made the object of an admin-
istrative search. Thus, in the earlier example of Abigail Jones, an
administrative search would not be in order, because the university has
no independent reason, apart from the interest in enforcing the crim-
inal law in general, for punishing or deterring such behavior. On the
other hand, the student who steals books from the university library
could be subjected to a warrantless administrative search, since his be-
havior poses a threat to the proper functioning of the school.
Summary and Conclusions
The evidentiary standard of the Fourth Amendment is not an un-
varying, rigid one demanding the same treatment in every situation. 200
197. See text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
198. See notes 160-62 & accompanying text supra.
199. Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 599-603.
200. La Fave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara
and See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (1967).
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Recent Supreme Court decisions ,have held that it is a flexible prin-
ciple, taking into account the balance of public and personal interests
in each case.20 1  New contexts and new problems require that the
rights of the individual and the rights of the institution or the state
be weighed anew.
In evaluating ,these interests, courts must take care that persons
entrusted with purely administrative functions do not arrogate to them-
selves a power properly entrusted only to law enforcement personnel.
At the same time, however, they must not place unreasonable ob-
stacles in the path of those who are charged with supervising the con-
duct of populations that are by nature young, often rebellious, and on
occasion heedless of the criminal law. In seeking to strike a balance,
courts will find that case law from earlier years is not a reliable guide.
Much law relating to colleges and schools was formulated in an era
when college education was a privilege enjoyed by only a favored
few202 and the legal rights of students did not command the judicial
attention they do today. Similarly, resort to isolated considerations of
public policy supplies no satisfactory solution. For example, efforts
to fortify the position of educational institutions by strengthening the
hand of college administrators, as has been seen, can result in a chaotic
picture of deputized and semi-deputized officials whose status under
the law is uncertain and who in all likelihood lack the training and
experience to carry out law enforcement functions effectively. In such
an environment, students and educators can easily come to regard each
other as adversaries, a condition scarcely conducive to good learning.
More importantly, the socialization of new generations of students
for active participation in democratic society can be undermined if
courts permit schools to use constitutionally questionable procedures
in an attempt to circumvent important guarantees. The young may
conclude that liberty may be treated lightly or analyzed away as an
inconvenient formality. In light of the doubt that exists concerning
the legality of such searches as those described at the outset of this
article, it is incumbent on courts and universities -to proceed only with
the greatest caution in this sensitive area affecting strongly held beliefs
and traditional personal liberties.
201. Id.; see notes 107-11 & accompanying text supra.
202. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 731
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw iN TRAN-
srrmoN Q. 1, 6-7 (1965).
Proposed Administrative Guidelines for Searches and
Seizures in University-Owned Housing
1. Administrative searches of student quarters conducted by ci-
vilian campus authorities need not conform to the constitutional require-
ments of probable cause and search when the object of the search is
compliance with campus regulations. Such searches may be made
when the administration has reasonable cause to believe that conduct
violative of campus rules is taking place within the student's room or
apartment.
2. Any search by the campus police or other university authority
conducted to discover or seize evidence of criminal activity may pro-
ceed only upon a showing of probable cause and after obtaining a
search warrant describing with particularity the place to be searched
and the objects to be seized.
3. When the university has good cause to believe that conduct
amounting to both a criminal violation and an infraction of campus rules
is taking place, either of the above procedures is appropriate.
4. Searches of student quarters may not be predicated on a con-
tractual provision in the housing agreement nor upon an implied
waiver at entrance.
5. The right to search based on the standard of guideline (1)
may not be delegated or shared with non-university personnel.
6. University personnel who enter and search students' quarters
should be aware that courts may consider them agents of the police
for Fourth Amendment purposes. To avoid liability, such personnel
should acquaint 'themselves with Fourth Amendment procedures, in-
cluding the obtaining of search warrants. Until they have familiarized
themselves with these procedures, university employees should refrain
from entering students' rooms unless the occupant consents or an
emergency exists.
7. Particular student groups should not be singled out for special
treatment. In particular, separate policies for married versus unmar-
ried student housing, or more expensive versus less expensive housing
are not justified.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
